This paper derives some further results on unconditionally secure asymmetric authentication schemes. It starts by giving a general framework for constructing A 2 -codes, identifying many known constructions as special cases. Then a full treatment of A 3 -codes (A 2 -codes protecting against arbiter's attacks) is given, including bounds on the parameters and optimal constructions.
Introduction
In Gilbert et. al. 1974 ], Simmons 1984] conventional authentication codes for two communicating parties were introduced. The authentication model introduced by Simmons Simmons 1984] contains a transmitter and a receiver, who share a common secret key. By usage of authentication codes, they can protect the transmission of a piece of information against an adversary, who can either impersonate the transmitter and insert a message on the channel, or replace a transmitted message with another. The codes are unconditionally secure, meaning that the security of the codes are not dependent on any complexity assumptions.
Since the two parties share the same key they must be assumed trustworthy. This is in many situations unnatural and Simmons Simmons 1990 ] therefore introduced extended authentication codes, called authentication codes with arbitration, or simply A (opponent) and also against some forms of deception from the insiders (transmitter and receiver). A fourth person, called the arbiter, is included. The arbiter is assumed to be honest, does not take part in any communication activities, and his sole task is to solve possible disputes between the transmitter and the receiver. In the A 2 -model the transmitter and the receiver must trust the arbiter's honesty. There are of course several situations where this is a very natural assumption, but there are nevertheless examples of the opposite, see Simmons 1990] . This problem has been addressed, and A 2 -codes providing protection against deceptions from the arbiter have been proposed Brickell and Stinson 1988a] , Desmedt and Yung 1990] . In the rst part of this paper, we consider authentication codes with arbitration and make a generalization of the construction part. We improve upon previous results for the case when the arbiter is not trusted, by giving constructions and tight bounds. The main observation here is that no increased key or message size is necessary when the arbiter may cheat. Instead, we can reduce the arbiter's key and obtain the desired protection.
A 2 -codes can be considered as a subclass of the more general concept asymmetric authentication schemes. An asymmetric authentication scheme is a scheme where the participants possess di erent keys which, in some way, are dependent. This dependence makes secure communication possible and provides protection against any speci ed attacks.
A main goal in this paper is to study the problem of constructing authentication systems where the scenario is even worse than the A 2 -model with a cheating arbiter. We consider systems where not only a single participant may cheat, but any speci ed subset of the participants. We call attacks from several collaborating participants collusion attacks. Already in the A 2 -model with a cheating arbiter, we can think of a possible collusion attack if the receiver and the arbiter collaborate and share their keys. It could be possible that they then determine the transmitter's key, or part of it, and can cheat successfully. Work on such a scenario has been initiated by Desmedt and Yung Desmedt and Yung 1990] . They introduced a broadcast model including a set of receivers, where subsets of receivers could cheat on another receiver. This was also described in Desmedt et. al. 1992] and further studied in Kurosawa and Obana 1997] and Safavi-Naini and Wang 1998 ]. We consider a more general (extended) model, where the transmitter is not assumed to be trusted, but is allowed to collaborate with a set of receivers in order to cheat another receiver. This will also open up the possibility of a dispute between the transmitter and a receiver, i.e, the transmitter denying having sent a message that was actually sent or a receiver claiming to have received a message that was actually never received. This general model allows us to build authentication schemes that are very close to usual (conditionally secure) digital signatures in the sense that the schemes can protect against any collusion of cheating participants. An attempt to construct a system with the above described requirements was done in Chaum and Roijakkers 1990] , but this approach used an interaction between participants. They named their solution unconditionally secure digital signature , a terminology that we also adopt. In our model, the solution is in the form of a code, meaning that there is only one transmission from the transmitter to send a message and no interaction.
To develop the above model, we start by discussing some aspects of trust, protection, and veri cation. We then de ne and construct several asymmetric authentication schemes, especially unconditionally secure digital signatures . Such a scheme has the same protection and veri cation properties as a usual digital signature. For example, any subset of participants may collaborate in order to cheat. Protection is provided against all these possible attempts to cheat, and additionally, each participant is able to verify that a message is authentic. However, there are still several fundamental di erences between unconditionally secure digital signatures and usual digital signatures, one being the fact that in an unconditionally secure solution each participant must hold his own secret key. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model for authentication codes with arbitration and in Section 3 we then present a generalization of the construction part of A 2 -codes. Section 4 treats the A 3 -model, i.e., the A 2 -model for the case when the arbiter is not trusted, and provides both bounds and constructions. In Section 5 we introduce general asymmetric authentication by describing possible collusion attacks and giving the de nitions for the di erent attacks in this general model. In Section 6 we construct unconditionally secure digital signatures both in projective space and using ideas from Section 3. Section 7 contains some information-theoretical bounds, providing bounds on the key size. We nally end with some conclusions.
Authentication with arbitration and its significance
Since A 2 -codes can serve as a building block that illustrates many of the features of unconditionally secure asymmetric authentication, it is suitable to start by giving a general treatment of this subject. Previous work Simmons 1987 Kurosawa and Obana 1995] have mainly considered more speci c constructions, but in this section we give a more general description of the construction part of A 2 -codes. This will later allow us to transfer ideas to more general models of asymmetric authentication. We refer to Simmons 1987] , Simmons 1984] for a more thorough treatment of the model that is used for A 2 -codes and a discussion around the di erent threats that appear.
In the A 2 -model, the transmitter and the receiver are not mutually trustworthy, and hence, disputes between them may occur. In order to solve possible disputes between the transmitter and the receiver, a fourth participant, called the arbiter, is included. The arbiter has access to all key information and, by de nition, does not cheat. The arbiter is only present to solve possible disputes and does not take part in any communication activities.
Codes for this model provide protection against deceptions both from an outsider (opponent) and from the insiders (transmitter and receiver). Recall that we only consider unconditional security, i.e., security against attacks performed with unlimited computing power.
As in conventional authentication, the transmitter wants to send some information, called a source state, to the receiver in such a way that the receiver can both recover the transmitted source state and verify that the transmitted message originates from the legitimate transmitter. The source state s, taken from the set S of possible source states, is encoded by the transmitter into a message m from the larger set M of possible messages. The message m is subsequently transmitted over the channel. The mapping from S to M is determined by the transmitter's secret encoding rule e t chosen from the set E T of possible encoding rules. We may assume that the transmitter uses a mapping g : S × E T → M. The mapping g satis es
(1)
In other words, the source state can be recovered uniquely from a transmitted message. The mapping g is deterministic, i.e., a source state can not be mapped into several messages for a given encoding rule (splitting is not allowed). This restriction is made for simplicity and most results that will be derived are also valid for
-codes that use splitting. As usual, the opponent has access to the channel in the sense that he can either impersonate the transmitter and send a message, or replace a transmitted message with a di erent one. The receiver must decide whether a received message is valid or not. For this purpose the receiver uses a mapping, determined by his own secret encoding rule e r taken from the set E R of possible encoding rules, that determines if the message is valid, and if so also the source state. We may assume a mapping h : M × E R → S ∪ {reject}, where for all possible (e t , e r ), i.e., P (e t , e r ) = 0, we have g(s, e t ) = m ⇒ h(m, e r ) = s.
(2)
For the receiver to accept all legal messages from the transmitter and to translate them to the correct source state, property (2) must hold for all possible pairs (e t , e r ). However, in general not all pairs (e t , e r ) will be possible, i.e., have a positive probability.
The arbiter is the supervisory person who has access to all information, including e t and e r , but does not take part in any communication activities on the channel. His only task is to resolve possible disputes between the transmitter and the receiver whenever such occur. This is done in the following way. If the message m, received by the receiver, could have been generated by the transmitter according to his encoding rule e t , then the arbiter decides that the message m was sent by the transmitter, and otherwise not. The arbiter is assumed to be honest.
In the A 2 -model the following ve types of cheating attacks are considered. Attack I: Impersonation by the opponent the opponent sends a message to the receiver and succeeds if this message is accepted by the receiver as authentic. Attack S: Substitution by the opponent the opponent observes a message that is transmitted and replaces this message with another. The opponent is successful if this other message is accepted by the receiver as authentic. Attack T: Impersonation by the transmitter the transmitter sends a message to the receiver and then denies having sent it. The transmitter succeeds if this message is accepted by the receiver as authentic, and if this message is not one of the messages that the transmitter could have generated according to his encoding rule. Attack R 0 : Impersonation by the receiver the receiver claims to have received a message from the transmitter. The receiver succeeds if this message could have been generated by the transmitter according to his encoding rule. Attack R 1 : Substitution by the receiver the receiver receives a message from the transmitter, but claims to have received another message. The receiver succeeds if this other message could have been generated by the transmitter according to his encoding rule.
All parameters in the model except the actual choices of encoding rules are public information. In all possible attempts to cheat it is understood that the cheating person uses an optimal strategy when choosing a message, or equivalently, that the cheating person chooses the message that maximizes his chances of success. For the ve possible types of deceptions, we denote the probability of success in each attack by P I , P S , P T , P R0 and P R1 , respectively. The formal de nitions are Definition 1.
where M(e t ) is the set of possible messages for the transmitter's encoding rule e t , i.e., M(e t ) = {m; f (s, e t ) = m, s ∈ S}.
We further introduce the following notations. Let E R (m) denote the set of the receiver's encoding rules for which m is a valid message, i.e., E R (m) = {e r ; g(m, e r ) ∈ S}. Similarly, let E T (m) denote the set of transmitter's encoding rules for which m can be generated, E T (m) = {e t ; f (s, e t ) = m, s ∈ S}. Recall that M(e t ) is the set of possible messages given encoding rule e t , M(e t ) = {m; f (s, e t ) = m, s ∈ S}. Let M(e r ) be the set of possible messages for encoding rule e r , M(e r ) = {m; g(m, e r ) ∈ S}. Finally, let E R (e t ) be the set of possible e r 's for a given e t , i.e., E R (e t ) = {e r ; g(m, e r ) ∈ S, ∀m ∈ M(e t )}, and let E T (e r ) be the set of possible e t 's for a given e r , i.e., E T (e r ) = {e t ; f (s, e t ) ∈ M(e r ), ∀s ∈ S}.
The support of a probability distribution P (X), denoted suppP (X), is the set of values of X ∈ X that have a positive probability, i.e., suppP (X) = {x ∈ X ; P (x) = 0}. Note that we equivalently could have made the de nitions using the support of the concerned probability distributions, for example, E R (m) = {e r ∈ suppP (E R |M = m)}.
Using the above notation it is possible to rewrite De nition 1 as
provided that we have Cartesian (no secrecy) A
2
-codes together with a uniform distribution on the support of P (E R , E T ), see Johansson 1994b] for further details.
In the sequel, we assume that this is the case. It is then convenient to use (8) (12) for calculating the di erent probabilities of success.
The overall probability of deception is denoted by P D and is de ned to be the maximum taken over all allowed attacks, in this case P D = max(P I , P S , P T , P R0 , P R1 ). The messages are all the planes intersecting the line L in a point. Since e r lies on the line e t , properly generated messages by the transmitter will always be accepted by the receiver. The arbiter knows the pair (e r , e t ). The parameters of the constructed A 2 -code are
and the probabilities of success for the di erent deceptions were in Johansson 1994a] proved to be
Our aim is now to introduce a new approach to construct A 2 -codes using modules of mappings. Let F = {f i } be a set of functions f i : S → R, where R is a commutative ring with unity. Furthermore, let F be a C-module, where C is a subring of R. Then we have the property c 1 f i + c 2 f j ∈ F, where (c 1 f i + c 2 f j )(s) = c 1 f i + c 2 f j for any c 1 , c 2 ∈ C and any f i , f j ∈ F, over C ⊆ R. Let F ′ be a set of functions
We randomly choose f, f 2 ∈ F, f 1 ∈ F ′ , and z ∈ C in such a way that
The general construction of A 2 -codes that we propose is now given as follows. Construction 2. The transmitter has as key e t the pair (f 1 , f 2 ) and the receiver has as key e r the pair (f, z), chosen according to (14) . To send the source state s ∈ S the transmitter generates the message
The receiver receives m = (s, m 2 , m 3 ) and accepts m if and only if f (s) = m 2 + zm 3 . In a correct transmission, m 2 = f 1 (s), m 3 = f 2 (s), and thus f (s) = f 1 (s) + zf 2 (s).
Let us introduce the notation
Furthermore, let
In the appendix we prove the following. Theorem 1. Construction 2 gives Cartesian A 2 -codes with parameters
and the probabilities of success in the di erent attacks are
We continue with a number of examples, identifying some known constructions of A 2 -codes as special cases of the above construction.
, and ǫ Kurosawa 1994] . We now give an example of a new construction obtained from Construction 2. Example 4. Consider the case R = C = F q . The family F of mappings forms a vector space over F q . Since each f ∈ F maps S into F q , each f ∈ F can be written as a vector of length |S| with entries in F q and where each position in the vector gives the value of f for a particular source state. Furthermore, there exists a set of mappings in F , {f 1 , f 2 . . . , f k }, that forms a basis. Hence, F can be represented by
where F then consists of all linear combinations of the rows. Clearly, an all zero column would give ǫ 0 = 1 and if two columns are linearly dependent we will have ǫ 1 = 1. Hence by writing down all linearly independent columns we obtain the matrix
where F q = {0, α 1 , α 2 . . . , α q−1 }. The length of the rows, i.e., the cardinality of S, is (q
It is now straightforward to prove that for this family of mappings ǫ 0 = ǫ 1 = 1/q (and ǫ
This family shows a slightly better performance, i.e., larger cardinality of S for given ǫ 0 = 1/q and ǫ 1 = 1/q, than previously proposed constructions.
A similar reasoning can be done for the case case R = F q l and C = F q , leading to a maximal cardinality of S = (q -codes, as pointed out by Simmons, is the fact that the transmitter and the receiver must trust the arbiter's honesty. There are of course several situations where this is a very natural assumption, but there are nevertheless examples of the opposite, see Simmons 1987] . This problem has been addressed, and constructions providing protection against deceptions from the arbiter have been proposed Brickell and Stinson 1988a] , Desmedt and Yung 1990] . The general approach to solve the problem of an untrusted arbiter has been to add some extra key bits that are shared among the participants (e.g. the transmitter and the receiver share some key bits unknown to the arbiter Desmedt and Yung 1990] ). Also the message size has been increased and in Taylor 1994] it was even erroneously claimed that this was necessary in order to obtain the desired protection 1 .
The purpose of this section is to show that the required protection can be achieved without increasing either the key sizes or the message size. We give the correct bounds on the message size and the key sizes for each participant and we show the tightness of the bounds by giving optimal constructions. We start by giving notation and the problem formulation. When the arbiter is not to be trusted, we add two possible attacks. Attack A 0 : Impersonation by the arbiter the arbiter sends a message to the receiver and succeeds if the message is accepted by the receiver as authentic. Attack A 1 : Substitution by the arbiter the arbiter observes a message that is transmitted, and replaces this message with another. The arbiter succeeds if the receiver accepts this other message as authentic.
Denote the probability of success for each attack with P A0 and P A1 , respectively.
The formal de nitions are
where e a ∈ E A denotes the arbiter's key taken from the set of possible keys for the arbiter. Let E R (e a ) be the set of possible e r 's for a given e a ∈ E A , i.e., E R (e a ) = {e r ∈ E R ; P (e r , e a ) = 0}. As before, we can rewrite (20) and (21) 
using the same assumptions as in (8)- (12). Even though the arbiter is not trusted, he is still assumed to make honest decisions in case of a dispute. Assume also that for a possible pair (e t , e a ), the arbiter with key e a always decides that m came from the transmitter if the transmitter could have generated m according to his key e t , i.e., if m ∈ M(e t ). Then the bounds for usual A 2 -codes derived in Johansson 1994a] are still valid. The overall probability of deception, P D , de ned as the maximum of the probabilities of success in all allowed attacks, is in this case taken over all seven types of attacks. Authentication codes that take caution against all these seven di erent ways to cheat are referred to as A 3 -codes.
4.1
Bounds on A
-codes
In order to derive new bounds we examine the probabilities of success for the R 0 and R 1 attacks. Recall that in the R 0 attack the receiver claims to have received a message m that was never sent, and succeeds if the arbiter decides that the transmitter could have generated the message. We rewrite the de nition of P R0 Johansson 1994a] as follows,
where χ(m, e a ) = 1 if for the key e a the arbiter decides that m came from the transmitter, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, in the R 1 attack m is received but the receiver claims that m ′ was received. He succeeds if the arbiter decides that the transmitter could have generated m ′ . The de nition of P R1 can thus be written as
We then derive the following lower bounds on P R0 and P R1 , which are alternative expressions for the lower bounds derived in Johansson 1994a]. Theorem 2. For any A 3 -code,
Proof. The proof is similar to the proofs given in Johansson 1994a], based on the proof of Simmons' bound in Massey 1992] , and can be found in the appendix. These lower bounds immediately give the following corollary. Corollary 3. For any A 3 -code we have
Proof. Multiplying the two bounds from Lemma 2 together we get
Using Johansson 1994a, Theorem 6] we can summarize the lower bounds for both 
In particular, if
, and |M| ≥ q 2 |S|.
We also address the problem of multiple authentication, which means authenticating a sequence of L random source states,
. . , L. Every source state s[l] must be individually authenticated, so that it is possible to verify the authenticity upon arrival. We assume that each transmission takes place in a slot and thus L slots are used to transmit the sequence
The overall probability of deception, P D , is in this case the maximal probability of success in an attack taken over all slots i, 1 ≤ i ≤ L. Considering A 3 -codes for multiple use, we can in a way similar to Theorem 4 derive the following theorem. Theorem 5. Any A 2 -code or A 3 -code for multiple use L times, with protection P D = 1/q, satis es
and |M| ≥ q 2 |S| at each use. Proof. This is an extension of the previously derived results and a proof is found in the appendix. . Thus the construction does not meet the lower bounds on any of the di erent participants keys, and more important, the message size does not meet the lower bound |M| ≥ q 2 |S|. We improve upon these results by considering a construction that meets all lower bounds in the previous subsection with equality. We construct an A 3 -code with |S| = q and P D = 1/q. Let s ∈ F q and m = (m 1 , m 2 , m 3 ), where m i ∈ F q , for i = 1, . . . , 3. Furthermore, let
where α i , β j ∈ F q , for i = 1, . . . , 4, j = 1, . . . , 3. The A 3 -code is now constructed similarly to the one given in Example 1. The receiver accepts all messages m = (m 1 , m 2 , m 3 ) that have
In case of a dispute, the arbiter decides that the message m = (s, m 2 , m 3 ) came from the transmitter if and only if m 2 = α 1 + sα 2 . In the key initialization phase, the encoding rules have been chosen such that
(32)
We must verify that the arbiter makes correct decisions, i.e., all messages sent by the transmitter must be considered by the arbiter to have originated from the transmitter. We see from (30) that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 6. Construction 3 gives Cartesian A 3 -codes with parameters
The probabilities of success in the di erent attacks are
Proof. We only have to consider the A 0 and A 1 attack, since the probabilities of success in the other attacks will remain the same as in Example 1. Attack A 0 : The arbiter sends a message m, and hopes for it to be accepted by the receiver. Knowing only (α 1 , α 2 ), all e r = (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 ) occur with the same probability. Thus E R (e a ) = E R and , all e r = (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 ) occur with the same probability. Thus
Let an A 3 -code be de ned to be perfect if its key and message sizes provide equality in Theorem 4, and let an A 3 -code be de ned to be equitably perfect if additionally P I = P S = P R0 = P R1 = P T = P A0 = P A1 . We then have the following corollary. Corollary 7. Construction 3 gives equitably perfect A 3 -codes. An important property of asymmetric authentication schemes is how the key setup can be done. The key initialization phase in Construction 3 does not have the same structure as in Desmedt and Yung 1990] . However, the following interesting property shows that no loss is made. Theorem 8. The key initialization in Construction 3 can be done using three secret interactions without changing the probabilities of success. Proof. Let the key initialization be as follows. The arbiter distributes (e to the transmitter and (f
to the receiver, according to (31) and (32). In a third interaction, the transmitter and the receiver interchange three random variables (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) from F q . The transmitter's key will now be e t = (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ) = (e 
We can verify that (31) and (32) hold. Also, the arbiter knows (e 1 , e 2 ) = (e ′ 1 , e ′ 2 ) which will be his key e a . But he has no knowledge about (f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ), since the random values were added. Checking the probabilities of success in the A 0 and A 1 attacks, we will nd them unchanged. Remark: In the A 1 attack we did not assume that the substitution attack must include a change of the source state as in Desmedt and Yung 1990] . If this assumption is made, the three random variables interchanged in the third interaction can be reduced to two random variables.
Construction 3 can be modi ed in order to obtain other parameters and we give the performance of two such modi cations. Theorem 9. There exist Cartesian A 3 -codes such that for P D = 1/q, they have parameters
Alternatively In slot l, the receiver accepts all messages
Here [[x] ] may be any linear mapping F q n → F q .
In case of a dispute, the arbiter decides that the message 
. . , L, and e 4 = f 2 + e 2 f 3 . We next calculate the probabilities of success for the di erent attacks. This step is omitted, but performing these calculations will result in a probability of success of 1/q in all allowed attacks, and thus P D = 1/q.
Collusion attacks and broadcast authentication schemes
We will now consider a generalization of our authentication model to contain a set of nontrusting participants, where deceptions may occur from any speci ed subset of the participants. Attacks from a set of collaborating participants are referred to as collusion attacks.
To further motivate these systems, we will rst mention an example described in Simmons 1992b] . This example, which has been studied by Simmons at Sandia National Laboratories Simmons 1992b], concerns veri cation of a treaty between two parties. The problem addressed is how to verify that a treaty between the United States and the former Soviet Union to stop all tests of nuclear weapons is ful lled. The idea is to let the Soviet Union have a monitoring station inside the United States and vice versa. The stations should be able to detect underground motions resulting from underground detonations and then send the measured data back home. The messages from these stations must be trustworthy, and a country must additionally be able to prove to a trusted third party that the measured data has not been tampered with. Since the measured data is already known, there should be no secrecy. Thus authentication between nontrusting parties and with no secrecy is suggested. One of the main features of this problem is that it cannot be solved by any solution that includes complexity assumptions. It is clear that no country would rely on the fact that the other country can not factor a 200 digit number or something similar. The only way the countries will agree on a solution is if its security can be formally proved. Hence, we require an unconditionally secure solution, and neither digital signatures or other topics from public-key cryptography, nor symmetric cryptographic algorithms like DES, etc., can be used.
In case of a situation where a violation against the treaty is detected, each nation wants to prove its innocence. Therefore, such a system will need an authority that is able to make a correct judgment, i.e., an arbiter with access to enough key information to solve possible disputes. This could for example be a neutral nation, the United Nations, etc.. Unfortunately, there is no arbiter who is unconditionally trusted by both parties. Thus new threats from the arbiter are added to the previous threats, and protection against a cheating arbiter must be provided.
It is moreover obvious that if only one neutral nation has the power of being the arbiter, he is a potential threat even if he cannot cheat on his own. He might for example join forces with one party, and together they could succeed in cheating. Hence a nation will agree to such a treaty only if they are totally convinced that no such collusion is a threat to the security. The arbiter also has the possibility to solve a dispute in a dishonest way, or simply to claim that he lost his key. We have now identi ed some new problems that have to be solved in this scenario. How can disputes be solved in an honest way and how do we protect against several participants joining their forces in order to cheat.
A possible solution to these problems is to introduce several verifying third parties (arbiters or receivers), and to construct the authentication codes in such a way that they protect against all attacks from collaborating sets of participants. The verifying participants can then together take a decision in case of a dispute. A model taking caution against these problems will be considered in the sequel, and will be referred to as the broadcast authentication model.
Our approach is to introduce several receivers that can verify each message's authenticity, and a single arbiter that is fully trusted for solving disputes. Note that this approach of using a fully trusted arbiter is taken for simplicity, i.e., so that the probabilities of success in di erent attacks can be de ned and calculated in a simple manner. In reality, having a set of receivers, we may not use a speci c arbiter but can consider a decision made by the majority of the receivers as a correct decision.
A related approach is to have a single arbiter and introduce a secret sharing scheme for the arbiter's key. Several arbiters may share the key in a perfect secret sharing scheme Simmons 1992c], resulting in the fact that no arbiter has any information about the key. But consider the following. In case of a dispute, a dishonest arbiter may give a false piece of information to the secret sharing scheme. Thus an incorrect key will be generated as the arbiter's key, and there is no possibility to solve the dispute. Hence the secret sharing scheme must be able to protect against such threats Tompa and Woll 1988], Brickell and Stinson 1988b] .
The idea of broadcast authentication schemes, i.e., schemes supporting several receivers, was rst introduced by Desmedt and Yung Desmedt and Yung 1990] , (see also Desmedt et. al. 1992] ). They considered a broadcast system with multiple receivers, where a set of colluding receivers tries to cheat another receiver. Codes for such a model is usually referred to as multi-receiver authentication codes and has been further investigated in Obana 1997, Safavi-Naini and Wang 1998 ].
We consider a more general (extended) model, and include any possible attack speci ed in the model. The main di erence from Desmedt and Yung 1990 ] is that we allow the existence of attacks from the transmitter colluding with some of the receivers. This includes the possibility of a dispute occurring.
A broadcast authentication system contains many (≥ 4) participants. This will introduce some new aspects concerning trust, protection, and veri cation. It is important that one explicitly states the possible threats that exist. In a broadcast authentication system, there will be many participants verifying a message. In our general setting we specify which participants should be able to verify that a message for a certain receiver is authentic. We can allow this set of verifying participants to be di erent for di erent receivers. We now describe a very general model for broadcast authentication.
The set of participants P consists of a transmitter T , a set of receivers R = {R i }, an arbiter A, and possibly a set of other participants O = {O i }. The transmitter T will generate a message m, and it can be addressed to any R i ∈ R, or to some speci ed subset of R. The address is contained in the source state s, and changing it implies a substitution attack. We also specify: how disputes are to be solved; which participants that may collude against another participant by giving a set of collaboration sets C = {C x } describing which collusions of cheating participants exist against participant x; and veri cation sets V x describing which participants that should be able to verify messages to a certain receiver x.
We next describe the existing attacks. There are two classes of attacks. The rst class of attacks is some subset of participants trying to get a fraudulent message accepted by some receiver, i.e., trying to cheat a receiver. We separate into two cases, depending on whether the transmitter is included in the cheating subset or not. We denote the probability of success as P I (C) for the impersonation, and P S (C) for the substitution attack, when the transmitter is not included in the cheating subset. If the transmitter is included, we denote the probability of success as P T (C).
The second class of attacks is a subset collaborating, claiming to have received a message that was never sent and thus trying to frame the transmitter. Here we have both the impersonation case and the substitution case. We denote the probability of success as P R0 (C) and P R1 (C), respectively.
Recall that M(e t ) is the set of messages that the transmitter can generate when he is in possession of the key e t , and let e(L) be the set of keys for a subset L of participants. Furthermore, let e Ri ∈ E Ri be receiver R i 's key. The de nitions of the probabilities of success in the di erent attacks are given as follows.
Definition 2.
Observe that in the R 0 (C) and R 1 (C) types of deceptions, we assume that success in an attack is equivalent to producing a message that the transmitter could have generated. The correctness of this assumption depends on how disputes are solved. We only consider the case when a fully trusted arbiter solves disputes by the rule that a message m originates from the transmitter if and only if m ∈ M(e t ).
Introducing E x (e(L)) as the set of possible keys for participant x if the keys e(L) for the set L of participants are given, i.e., E x (e(L)) = {e x ; e x ∈ suppP (E x |E(L))}, and E x (m) de ned by E x (m) = {e x ; e x ∈ suppP (E x |M )}, the above de nitions can be rewritten in the following form,
It might be appropriate to further describe the di erences between our model and the model used by Desmedt and Yung Desmedt and Yung 1990] . They consider a broadcast model where the collaboration sets C x only may consist of receivers, i.e., C x ⊆ R. In other words, they assume a trusted transmitter and hence do not consider the class of attacks giving the probabilities P T (C), P R0 (C) and P R1 (C). Our model allow any collusion, i.e., C x ⊆ P. In particular, we do not assume a trusted sender, but consider collusions between the sender and some receivers possible. Hence we provide protection against disputes between the transmitter and a receiver that might occur. This general model allows us to build authentication schemes that are very close to conditionally secure digital signatures. The techniques we use to construct such schemes are similar to those used by Desmedt and Yung. We de ne some important classes of broadcast authentication schemes. Definition 3. Let the set of participants be P = {T, R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n , A}, for some n, and such that
• An honest arbiter A makes decisions in case of a dispute;
• All attacks from any subset of at most k participants (excluding the arbiter) exist against all participants, i.e., C x = {B ⊆ P \ {x, A}; |B| ≤ k}, ∀x ∈ P.
• The veri cation sets are V i = {R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n , A}, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. We call a code giving protection in such a system an (k, n)-threshold unconditionally secure digital signature, or (k, n)-threshold USDS for short. If k = 1, we call it a single-attack broadcast authentication scheme and if k = n we simply call the code an USDS.
This de nition is inspired by the work of Chaum and Roijakkers Chaum and Roijakkers 1990] who introduced the notion of an unconditionally secure digital signature. Their approach was to construct an unconditionally secure solution through an interaction between the participants. Our solution will be in the form of a code, meaning that there is no interaction but merely one broadcast transmission of a codeword from the transmitter to all the participants.
Observe further that we add an arbiter for simplicity only. In practice, we would for example have the majority of the receivers resolve the dispute. But assuming an honest arbiter simpli es the analysis of how a possible dispute is settled, and hence the calculus of the probabilities of success in the di erent attacks.
Let us end this section by a comparison between a usual conditionally secure digital signature Mitchell et. al. 1992 ] and the codes in our model. Besides the fact that only the sender can sign valid messages, two important properties of digital signatures are the following.
• Any subset of participants trying to cheat succeeds only with a small probability.
• The authenticity of a message can be veri ed by all participants. These are properties that we also nd in our codes. We should also note the di erences from a usual digital signature. In our codes each participant must have his own secret key. Together with a large message size, this is in some sense the price we have to pay for having unconditional security. Also, for multiple use we must refresh a part of each participant's key for each transmission. On the positive side, we will see that besides the unconditional security the constructions have a very simple and fast implementation.
Constructions of unconditionally secure digital signatures
In order to construct di erent broadcast authentication schemes, we will take two di erent approaches. In the rst approach we will use a geometric language and construct codes in projective space. In the second approach we will generalize the proposed ideas in Section 3 in order to get a solution that is as general as possible.
Examining Construction 1 from Section 3 we only have to make a small modication in order to obtain a single-attack broadcast authentication scheme. Construction 4. Fix a line L in PG(3, F q ), q > n, where the points on L are source states. The transmitter's key is a line e t not intersecting L. Each receiver has a key e Ri which is a point on the line e t , and all e Ri are di erent points.
The transmitter generates the message as the plane m = e t , s . A receiver R i accepts a message only if the point e Ri is contained in the received plane.
Let us give the parameters of this construction. Theorem 10. Construction 4 gives a Cartesian single-attack broadcast authentication scheme with parameters
The proof is a special case of the the proof of Theorem 11. We previously mentioned two disadvantages with an USDS compared to a usual digital signature, the fact that each participant must have his own secret key, and the long message size. The last disadvantage can be partly removed, if we restrict the number of participants in any collusion attack to a certain maximum value. We can construct an (k, n)-threshold USDS as follows.
Construction 5. Fix a line L in PG(k+2, F q ), where the points on L are regarded as source states. The transmitter's key is a k-at e t not intersecting L. Each receiver has a key e Ri , which is a point on the k-at e t . All these points are chosen such that the union of any k + 1 points is a k-at.
The transmitter generates the message m as the (k + 1)-at m = e t , s . A receiver R i accepts a message m only if the point e Ri is contained in the received (k + 1)-at m.
The parameters of the construction are given by the following theorem.
Theorem 11. Construction 5 gives a Cartesian (k, n)-threshold USDS with parameters
and protection
An important requirement of the construction is that n points should be placed on a k-at in such a way that any k + 1 points span the k-at. This requirement implies a restriction on the pair (k, n) for the construction. In order to examine this restriction, we give some known results.
We are interested in a set Q of n points in PG(k, F q ), such that the union of any k+1 points in Q is a k-at. We review some concepts from Hirschfeld and Thas 1991] . A set Q with the above mentioned property is called a k-arc. In PG(3, F q ), the maximal number of points on a 3-arc is q + 1 for q > 3. In the general case PG(k, F q ), the maximum number of points in a k-arc is not completely known, but it has been shown to be q +1 for many cases. However, it is known that the maximum number of points in a k-arc is at least q + 1 (see also Goppa 1988] ). Furthermore, the problem of nding the maximal number of points in a k-arc in PG(k, F q ) is equivalent to the problem of nding the maximum length of an MDS-code over F q with minimum distance k + 2 MacWilliams and Sloane 1977], Goppa 1988] .
In our constructions, we will usually demand the probability of deception to be small. Thus the restriction n ≤ q + 1 has no strong practical relevance. As an alternative, we can modify the construction and choose the set of points for the participants, excluding the transmitter, independent and uniformly distributed. This will slightly increase the probability of deception, but may give advantages. It removes the above restriction and it might simplify the implementation and the key setup.
We next construct USDS using our second approach. Recall the notation from Section 3 and let C = R and F = F ′ . Starting with an example, consider (k, n) = (2, 4). The construction is as follows. Choose functions f
where the matrix has rank 3. The transmitter's key is e t = (f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) and receiver R i has key e Ri = (f
and similarly for the other receivers. Let us consider the di erent attacks in an informal manner. In the P I (C) and P S (C) attacks, a set of at most 2 receivers, say R 2 and R 3 , tries an attack against another receiver, say R 1 , by trying to get a message accepted by that receiver. Knowing two equations in f 1 , f 2 , f 3 leaves them with a one degree uncertainty on the above functions and hence on f , and they will succeed only with probability ǫ 0 and ǫ 1 respectively. In the P T (C) attack, a message di erent from the one the transmitter can generate must be sent. The transmitter may collude with one receiver, say R 2 , but remains uncertain about the value of z 2 , z 3 . This will give a probability of success of ǫ ′′ . In the P R0 (C) and P R1 (C) attacks, a set of at most 2 receivers tries an attack by claiming to have received a message. Again, knowing two equations in f 1 , f 2 , f 3 leaves them with an uncertainty on the above functions, and they will succeed only with probability ǫ 1 . It is now clear that any (k, n)-threshold USDS can be constructed in this manner.
. . .
where any (k + 1) rows of the matrix are linearly independent. The transmitter's key is e t = (f 1 , . . . , f k+1 ) and receiver R i has key e Ri = (f
). The transmitter sends the message m = (s, f 1 (s), . . . , f k+1 (s)) and receiver R i checks that
(46) for authenticity of a received message. Theorem 12. Construction 6 gives a Cartesian (k, n)-threshold USDS with parameters
Proof. See appendix. The matrix in (45) can be obtained by picking random matrices until any k + 1 rows are linearly independent. The theme of this construction is the same as the previous one, but now the construction is for a general family F of mappings. An example of performance is given by the following corollary. Corollary 13. Let F = {f (s); f (s) = as + b, ∀a, b ∈ F q }. Then Construction 6 gives a Cartesian (k, n)-threshold USDS, where
Proof. Calculating ǫ 0 , ǫ 1 and ǫ ′′ for F gives the result. Finally, we end this section by giving an example with collusion sets that are not of threshold type. Consider the following scenario. An authority (e.g. the stock market) is transmitting messages to clients (e.g. stockbrokers), who can be divided into two groups (e.g two companies buying and selling stocks). A client in a group trusts the other group members quite well but clients in the other group are not trusted at all. This situation is well suited to the assumption that a client faces a collusion attack where any k clients in his own group together with all clients in the other group may collude. Hence we let C x consist of all subsets of participants including k participants from his own group, or k − 1 together with the transmitter, and all participants from the other group. Here is how a construction in projective space would look like. Construction 7. Fix a line L in PG(2k + 2, F q ), where the points on L are regarded as source states. The transmitter's key is a 2k-at e t not intersecting L. On e t two non-intersecting k-ats, call them N 1 and N 2 , are chosen. Each receiver of group one has a key e Ri , which is a point on the k-at N 1 , and each receiver of group two has a key e Ri , which is a point on the k-at N 2 .
The transmitter generates the message m as the (2k + 1)-at m = e t , s . A receiver R i accepts a message m only if the point e Ri is contained in the received
Without giving a proof we note that deriving the parameters of the construction similar to what has been done before would give a probability of at most 1/q of success in any possible attack. There are of course numerous ways to generalize these ideas, for example to m di erent groups, di erent trust levels in di erent groups, and limiting the number of cheating groups (or groups of groups).
7 Bounds on the key sizes for broadcast authentication schemes Finally, we derive some information-theoretical bounds for our broadcast model. Let
, and P R1 (L) denote the probability of success in an attack of type I, S, T , R 0 , and R 1 , respectively, when the attack is performed by the set L. In the rst three cases, the attack is directed against R i . This means that the de nition of P I (C) can be expressed as
and similar for the other attacks. Theorem 14. The probabilities of success in the di erent attacks are lower bounded by
Proof. See appendix. By considering an (k, n)-threshold USDS and multiplying we get,
which immediately gives the following combinatorial bound. Corollary 15. For any (k, n)-threshold USDS with P D ≤ 1/q we have
Thus we see that the performance given by Theorem 11 is as good as it can be. Furthermore, Corollary 15 also proves the optimality of the scheme proposed by Desmedt and Yung Desmedt and Yung 1990] in their model with a trusted transmitter.
Since it is possible to use n independent A 2 -codes in a broadcast model, one can not get a better bound than |E Ri | ≥ q 3 for each receiver's key if P D ≤ 1/q. Observe however that n independent A 2 -codes requires a large message size (concatenating n individual messages) and that the transmitter's key in this case is huge.
Concluding remarks
We considered the extension of the authentication model to a case when protection against collusion attacks must be provided when several verifying participants are introduced. We emphasized on de ning some useful systems and then showed how they could be constructed. We also provided some useful bounds to estimate the performance of proposed constructions.
In many applications, there is no need for the property that the authenticity of a message can be veri ed by everyone. It might be more interesting for the transmitter/receiver pair that the authority with the power of making a judgment can verify and make correct decisions, or that this power can be split on a few instances. It might in some cases even be favorable if the number of veri ers is limited.
An interesting application of the proposed USDS is to consider multiple use and create provably secure digital signatures by combining a pseudo-random number generator with an USDS. Considering for simplicity the multiple use construction in the proof of Theorem 9, we need to generate dependent keys in the form
The simplest way to do this would be to have three independent pseudo-random number generators. The rst two generates e 1 [l] and e 3 [l] and the third generates
By publishing all c [l] in public and giving the seeds of the pseudo-random generator to the participants, respectively, we have a set of dependent keys in the required form. This requires a trusted authority to distribute the seeds, but it is possible to consider interactions in the key initialization as in Theorem 8. Furthermore, these ideas are of course valid for USDS in general. The main advantage is that the generation and veri cation of the authenticity of messages can be done very fast. The keys valid for the next message to be generated/veri ed requires the pseudo-random generator to calculate the next number, but this value can be precomputed. Such considerations have practical importance, see for example Even et. al. 1996] .
An interesting open problem would be to nd a pseudo-random number generator that can generate dependent keys directly, without requiring a public list of L numbers (c[l] |{f ∈ F, z ∈ C ; f (s) = m 2 + zm 3 }| |{f ∈ F, z ∈ C}| = max s,m2
|{f ∈ F ; f (s) = m 2 }| |{f ∈ F }| = ǫ 0 .
Using (9) we have
Using (10) we have
Using (11) we have
Using (12) we have
B Proof of Theorem 2
From (24) it is clear that
Now (m, e r , e a ) is in the support of P (M, E R , E A ) only if χ(m, e a ) = 1, since if χ(m, e a ) = 0 then m is not a message that might be generated by the transmitter and thus P (m, e r , e a ) = 0. Thus we can equivalently write
where the summation is taken over the support of P (M, E R , E A ). The last inequality can now be expressed in terms of an expectation as
where the expectation is taken over all possible tuples (m, e r , e a ). This is equivalently written as log P R0 ≥ log E P (m, e r )P (e a |e r ) P (m, e r , e a ) , and using Jensen's inequality Cover and Thomas 1991] we get log P R0 ≥ E log P (m, e r )P (e a |e r ) P (m, e r , e a ) .
The nal step consists of identifying that E log P (m, e r )P (e a |e r ) P (m, e r , e a ) = −H(M,
and thus
For the second bound, it follows from (25) that
Following the same line as above, we nally reach the expression
Here M ′ represents a valid message di erent from M , which exists if |S| ≥ 2.
C Proof of Theorem 5
For attack X, let P X [l] denote the probability of success in the l-th slot. The rst step in the proof is to derive the information-theoretical bounds
We do not do the derivation here but refer to Johansson 1994a, Lemma 12], which gives a simple way of verifying these expressions, (see also the proof of Theorem 2 which is on the same line). In the cases (49) and (49), we get the expressions
respectively. Since the transmitter generates the message
Hence these expressions can be reformulated to give (49) and (49). In (51) (54) two alternative expressions are given for P R0 and P R1 . The latter follows from our assumption that all messages in M(e t ) are considered by the arbiter to origin from the transmitter. The next step is to multiply the bounds together in di erent ways. Firstly,
. For the next bound, we multiply in the following way,
D Proof of Theorem 11
The set of messages is all the 
Finally, the sets E Ri are all the points not on L, and has cardinality
Attack I(C): By symmetry we can choose any R i and L of maximal size such that The number of k-ats on the (k+1)-at m containing the given
Since m intersects L in a point s, there will be one k-at intersecting L. Thus the numerator is q. For the denominator, the number of k-ats containing the given
Here we will have q + 1 of these k-ats intersecting L in a point. Thus the denominator is q 2 , and
Attack S(C): Here m ′ ∩ m is a k-at not intersecting L. As for the impersonation attack, we can express P S (C) as
and not intersecting L}| |{k-ats on m containing the (k−1)-at e(L) and not intersecting L}| The number of k-ats on the k-at m ′ ∩ m containing the given (k−1)-at e(L) is of course 1. We previously showed that the denominator is q. Thus
Attack T (C): We can choose any R i and L of maximal size such that R i ∈ L, T ∈ L. Now e(L \ T ) is a (k−2)-at, and e t is a k-at. To succeed in the attack, the message m must be chosen such that e t is not contained in m, i.e., e t ∩ m is a (k−1)-at. As before, the attack is successful if and only if the (k−1)-at e(L \ T ) ∪ e Ri is contained in the message m. Then
The numerator is 1 and the denominator is The number of k-ats on m ′ ∩m containing the given (k−1)-at e(L) is 1. Previously, we saw that we had q as denominator. Thus P R1 (C) = 1/q.
E Proof of Theorem 12
We rst introduce some short notation. Let U k denote a set of k di erent receivers {R i1 , R i2 , . . . , R i k }, and let K(U k ), l(U k ), and f be de ned by
. . . z 
2 , . . . , z
k+1 ∈ C ; m2 +z
2 m3 + · · · +z
2 , z
3 , . . . , z
Since K(U k ) together with (1, z
k+1 ) is a nonsingular (k + 1) × (k + 1) matrix f
( 1) can take any value for any possible (1, z (1) k+1
k+1 ∈ C ; m 2 +z
2 m 3 +···+z
(1) k+1
Again, since K(U k ) together with (1, z
k+1 ) is a nonsingular (k + 1) × (k + 1) matrix f 
k+1 ∈ C ; f 1 (s)+c 1 +···+z 
F Proof of Theorem 14
Again, the derivation of these information theoretical bounds are very similar to the previous ones found in Theorem 2, Theorem 5 and Johansson 1994a, Lemma 12]. We show a derivation for P I (C) and leave the other cases for the reader.
By de nition where χ(m, e Ri ) = 1 if message m is accepted by R i under key e Ri . Any (m, e Ri , e(L)) in the support of P (M, E Ri , E(L)) has χ(m, e Ri ) = 1, since then m is a message that might be generated by the transmitter. Thus we can equivalently write
P (m, e(L))P (e Ri |e(L)) P (m, e Ri , e(L)) P (m, e Ri , e(L)) ,
where the summation is taken over the support of P (M, E Ri , E(L)). In terms of an expectation the last inequality is expressed as
where the expectation is taken over all possible tuples (m, e Ri , e(L)). This is equivalently written as log P Ri I (L) ≥ log E P (m, e(L))P (e Ri |e(L)) P (m, e Ri , e(L)) , and using Jensen's inequality Cover and Thomas 1991] we get log P Ri I (L) ≥ E log P (m, e(L))P (e Ri |e(L)) P (m, e Ri , e(L)) ,
The nal step consists of identifying that E log P (m, e(L))P (e Ri |e(L)) P (m, e Ri , e(L))
and thus log P R0 ≥ −I(M ; E Ri |E(L)).
Next, note the fact that P (e Ri |e t ) = P (e Ri |m, e t ). As a consequence, I(M ; E Ri |E(L)) = I(E T ; E Ri |E(L)) − I(E T ; E Ri |M, E(L)).
This proves the bound for P Ri I (L). The other bounds are proved similarly.
